International Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol.:04, Issue:03,July-Sep,2025
PP: 1-21

OPEN ACCESS
IRJSSH
ISSN (Online): 2959-1392
ISSN (Print): 2959-2887
www. irjssh.com

AN ASSESSMENT OF PAK-U.S RELATIONS DURING JUNGEO ERA 1985-1988

Mr.Azhar Maqsood Sirwar
lecturer Political Science Ghazi University Dera Ghazi Khan.
Email: azharmaqsood@hotmail.com

Dr. Muhammad Aslam Faiz
Lecturer Pakistan Studies Ghazi University Dera Ghazi.
Email: Mafaiz,@gudgk.edu.pk

Mr. Kaleem Raza
PhD Scholar GCU Fasail Abad.
Email: kaleemraza@gmail.com

Abstract

This study provides a comprehensive assessment of Pak–U. S relations during the term of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo (1985–1988) a period situated at the intersection of Cold War politics, regional security challenges, and Pakistan's domestic political transition. Following the Soviet withdrawl form Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as a frontline state for U.S. strategic interests, receiving significant economic and military assistance. During the Junejo era, bilateral relations were shaped by mutual dependence: Washington depend on on Islamabad to sustain the Afghan resistance, while Pakistan viewed U.S. aid as essential for strengthening its defense and economy. However, this relationship was not without friction. The U.S. consistently raised concerns regarding Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, leading to debates surrounding the Pressler Amendment and conditional aid packages. Junejo, unlike General Zia-ul-Haq, attempted to adopt a more independent and pragmatic foreign policy approach by emphasizing parliamentary democracy, asserting civilian oversight, and cautiously balancing external commitments with domestic priorities. The paper analyzes key dimensions of this era, including cooperation in the Afghan war, U.S. aid flows, nuclear policy disputes, and Junejo's independent position on issues such as the

Geneva Accords. It highlights how Junejo's cautious assertion of autonomy, while maintaining alliance commitments, reflected the difficulties of managing external pressures alongside domestic democratization. Ultimately, the research argues that Pak–U.S. relations during Junejo's premiership were marked by both strategic convergence and structural contradictions, foreshadowing the returning patterns of dependency and mistrust that have continued to characterize the bilateral relationship in subsequent decades.

Keywords: *U.S, Pressler, Jenva Accord, Mascow ,Taliban.*

INTRODUCTION

On March 10, 1985, President Zia announced the restoration of 252 out of 280 articles of the constitution of 1973. The sessions of the provincial assemblies were also held in March and senators were elected during these sessions. The National Assembly's session took place on March 20. The Senate held its first session on March 21 and a joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate was held on March 23, 1985. On March 20, President Zia nominated Muhammad Khan Junajo as Prime Minister of Pakistan, after consulting the members of the National parliament. Ghulam lshaq Khan was elected as the Chairman of Senate on March 21. On March 22, Sayed Fakhar lmam was elected as Speaker of the National Assembly despite the opposition from President Zia. The Prime Minister took oath of office on March 23, 1985.

After taking over as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Khan Junajo declared that Martial law and Civilian government could not go together. He therefore promised to lift Martial Law soon. He also expressed his views to take effective steps against bribery, corruption, red tape and inefficiency.[1]

After the lifting of Martial law, Prime Minister Junajo addressed the nation over radio and television on December 31, he said that: "It was a tragedy that Pakistan remained under Martial Law for 17 out of 38 years of its life. He appealed to the people that if in future, they wanted to change the government; they should avoid agitation, so as the martial law could not get this way"

In the middle of 1986, Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Juiajo visited Turkey, Germany and the United States. During these visits, he got the credit

of the lifting of Martial Law and the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. He also held a meeting with the American President, Ronald Reagan. A warm welcome and hospitality was extended to Junajo during his trip to America in July 1, 1986. Regan convinced him and General Ant that Americans had earnestly recognized the newly elected government in Pakistan and had given it the N. O.C. for the next five years.[2]

During this visit, the Reagan administration provides a chance to apply Pakistan more open political system aid to reaffirm the bilateral partnership. The most tangible sign was US willingness to provide $4.02 billion worth of aid over the next six years, While the earlier multiyear assistance package (1981—86) had been equally divided between military and economic assistance, at suggestion, 57 percent of the new six-year commitment (1987—93) would be for development aid and only 43 percent for security assistance. The prime minister, in fact had little voice in the management of the nuclear program. In talking with Americans, he hewed strictly to — official line that it was "purely for peaceful purposes," In a meeting at the Washington Post, however, Jungejo wandered off the reservation when he confirmed that Pakistan would not enrich uranium beyond the 5 percent level mentioned in Reagan's September 1984 letter .Zia himself was always careful to avoid making an explicit commitment on the level of enrichment, falling back on his mantra, "We won't embarrass our friends".

In October I 986, President Reagan certified lot the first time under the Pressure amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and that American aid "reduces significantly" the risk that Pakistan would acquire one. A few days later, Washington was jarred by leaked intelligence reports indicating that Pakistan had tested a triggering device for a nuclear weapon and had enriched uranium to weapons grade. The press quoted an anonymous US official as saying that Pakistan was only "two screwdriver turns" away from possessing a fully assembled weapon. Still, according to Undersecretary of state for political affairs Michael arm cost (the key state department official dealing with Afghanistan), there was enough doubt in the intelligence community to enable the administration to avoid imposing sanctions under the Pressers amendment: "There was no smoking gun and the fact of differences among the intelligence analysis pointed to the uncertainty". [3]

THE GENEVA ACCORD AND PAK-US STRATEGIES

The UN-sponsored 'proximity', talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which had been going on intermittently since 1982, had considerably narrowed the differences between the two governments.[4] By 1987, agreements had already been reached on the repatriation of refugees, ending 'external interference' in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, a superpower guarantee of the peace settlement and an agreement on monitoring the compliance of the settlement by the UN. The only stumbling block was the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Pakistan insisted on a 'short time-frame' for the withdrawal of the forces in the hope that this would give the various guerrilla groups operating from Pakistan a chance to overthrow the Kabul regime before it had time to consolidate its position. It was also precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union wanted to stagger its withdrawal over several years so as to give its client regime a longer transition period, in which to consolidate its position. By early 1988 the Soviet desire to pull out its troops, coupled with' its confidence that the Kabul Regime would endure without direct help, was such that Gorbachev agreed to reduce the period of withdrawal to nine months starting on 15 May.[5] The commitment to a 'front-loaded' withdrawal—an undertaking that a 'relatively greater proportion' of the estimated 115,000 Soviet troops ,would be withdrawn in the early stages of the process—ensured its irreversibility and satisfied one of the key preconditions of the US.

The Geneva Accords were signed on 14 April 1988. It's cleared the way for the withdrawal of Soviet forces but failed to end the war or create an environment which would have facilitated the repatriation of nearly five million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere.[6] The most important of all the accords did nothing to prevent intervention by external powers in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. In retrospect none of this is really surprising. The Geneva 'proximity' talks between Pakistan and the Kabul regime had excluded the Mujahidin: the protracted negotiations were confined mainly to securing the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and had not addressed the question of civil war which predated the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The civil war was deeply rooted in ethnic trial strife and the singular failure of the PDPA and other urban political organizations to co-opt the diverse elites competing for the capture of governmental power. The

refusal of the Mujahidin to participate in the negotiations meant that there would be no agreement on the constitution of a transitional government acceptable to the different Afghan factions.[7] The external powers…especially the US, the Soviet Union and Pakistan were primarily concerned with furthering their own objectives. The restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan was not high on their agenda. The questions therefore arise as to why the accords were signed and what the different players hoped to gain from them.

It was obvious, as has been argued above, that the Soviet Union was under enormous domestic and international pressure to with draw its troops. At the same time, however, unlike the other external powers, it had direct and enduring geo-strategic interests in Afghanistan which it could sacrifice lightly. It accepted the accords because they made possible the withdrawal of its forces without excessive loss of face—UN 1ikethe American evacuation of Saigon, the Soviet retreat was not the result of a defeat hut, it was not prepared to abandon its allies in Kabul to be overthrown by the US-backed mujahidin.[8] The Soviet supply of weapons and food continued unabated. The Americans too were now preoccupied with the forthcoming Reagan—Gorbachev summit meeting and needed to smoothen out the 'minor' irritations so as not to jeopardize the superpower arms control agreement. Not surprisingly they exerted considerable pressure on a reluctant Zia to sign the accords. It is also clear-in retrospect that the American intelligence reports on Afghanistan were completely faulty. The US was so convinced that Najib's regime would not survive once the Russians left that it did not consider it necessary to work out transitional arrangements.

The massive failure of US intelligence can perhaps be explained by its excessive reliance or Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (1SI). The 1SI which controlled Pakistan's Afghan operation and acted as the liaison between the JS and the Mujahidin was not keen on a political settlement. It needed a military victory both to strengthen the military in Pakistan's domestic politics and to position Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Kabul. It is quite conceivable that the ISI may have exaggerated Hekmatyar's real capability so as to ensure that he continued to receive the lion's share of military and economic assistance. In fact, Hekmatyar was the least popular of the Mujahidin leaders both among the Afghan refugees and inside Afghanistan, and his choice by the 1SI may have been precisely motivated

by that factor: Hekmatyar in Kabul would remain a puppet of the ISI and consequently ensure the new regime's dependence on Pakistan. In any event the CIA was sufficiently duped into believing that the Kabul regime would collapse easily, or perhaps it was merely a victim of its own propaganda which had persistently maintained that the fall of Kabul was imminent. The subsequent dismissal of the CIA's operational chief for Afghanistan was a belated recognition of the agency's dismal failure.[9]

Although there was no reference to it in the formal agreement, the so-called principle of the 'symmetry' of arms supplies whereby both the US and the USSR reserved the right to continue to arm their respective allies—ensured that the accords would inevitably be breached. Under the original agreement the US was obliged to stop military support to the mujahidin without a corresponding stipulation for the Soviet Union to stop supplying the Kabul regime, presumably on the grounds that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan had a. 'treaty of friendship which allowed for such an arrangement. At the very last moment the US objected to the arrangement and instead proposed a 'negative symmetry', under which both sides would stop supplying arms, but this was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The deadlock was finally broken by Soviet agreement, after an initial turn-down, to a modified US suggestion of 'positive supplies in response to a similar move by the other.[10] *The superpowers promised to exercise restraint but were under no formal obligation to cut off the flow of aid. This at once exposed the absurdity of the superpower guarantee of ensuring 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Both sides, as was to be expected, continued to supply weapons.*

The failure of the mujahidin to overthrow Najib's government after the Soviet withdrawal threw the American policy in Afghanistan into disarray.[11] *The enormous propaganda and diplomatic coup which had been achieved by the expulsion of the Red Army had been largely lost by the endurance of the Kabul regime.*[12] *Understandably enough Washington was chafed as the Soviet Union escaped the much hoped for humiliation to compensate for the earlier American mortification in Saigon. The US therefore remained committed to ousting Najib's government. Indeed, there was some logic in the US stand the Soviet troops had been Expelled and therefore it was unacceptable that a regime imposed by the force of the Soviet army should*

be allowed to continue. However, this logic not only ignored the reality of Najib's ability to survive but also highlighted the limitations of the US policy. There can be no doubt that without military and economic assistance from the US the mujahidin could scarcely have continued their jihad for so long, but, at the same time, the American support had its obvious drawbacks. While the supply of sophisticated weapons enabled the Mujahidin to engage the Russians, it was not adequate to actually tilt the military balance decisively: to defeat Najib would have required a significant enhancement in the American commitment including the provision of air cover for the mujahidin. But the Americans were not willing to escalate a war which might involve them and Pakistan directly. It was inconceivable that US public opinion would be prepared to shed American blood in Afghanistan. On the other hand it was understandable that the US could not reconcile itself to the fact that the Soviet Union should be allowed to turn tragedy into triumph.

The mujahidin's failure to overthrow the Kabul regime and the subsequent fiasco during the bid to capture Jalalabad under the gaze of the international media seriously embarrassed the US administration. For the first time, the American public and members of Congress began to question the government's policy of arming the squabbling mujahidin leaders in Peshawar.[13] But having been led to believe that the fall of Kabul was inevitable once the Soviet troops left, the administration was unwilling abandon its objective without a final military thrust. US arms began to be sent directly to mujahidin field commanders parley because this would enable them to bypass the quarrelling Peshawar-based leaders but also in the hope that it might pre-empt Kabul's efforts to strike a deal with them. Some of these field commanders, like their leaders in Peshawar, were divided ethnically and politically and were incapable of putting aside their rivalries to mount a successful assault against Kabul.

WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN

Some months earlier, in September 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had advised secretary of state Shultz privately that soviet troops would leave Afghanistan within a year. Despite this, Shultz sensed that there might be a change regarding Afghanistan after the November 1985 US—Soviet summit in Geneva. The secretary of state told NBC News that Gorbachev had "some interesting and a little different kind of things to say. "A month later, on December 13, 1985, the United States

formally engaged itself in the Geneva peace process by declaring that it was willing to serve as a guarantor power to the accords. Tucked into a speech before the World Affairs Council of Washington, the statement by Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, which National Security Council staff member Donald Fattier had cleared, and triggered vociferous opposition from conservatives who feared a set out of the mujahedeen. The State Department defended lie step, arguing that it put the Soviets on the defensive diplomatically and that, in any case, the Geneva negotiations were unlikely to achieve concrete results.

On February 26, 1986, Gorbachev signaled a shift in the Soviet attitude toward Afghanistan more concretely, telling the Twenty seventh congress of the Soviet Communist party that the war had become "a bleeding wound". A month later, in March 1986, the Kabul regime finally offered a timetable for the withdrawal of the Soviet military. Although there was an enormous gap between the four year schedule that Kabul proposed and the three to four months that Pakistan wanted, the afghan move set in train the process of more serious bargaining at Geneva.[14]

On the ground iii Afghanistan, the Soviets appeared to be making head - way through I improved and more aggressive tactics, especially greater use of helicopter gunships the mujahedeen lacked an adequate defense against these helicopters and were beginning to suffer as the Soviets pressed gunship attacks. When resistance leaders sought to obtain times, I US made. Stringer missile, a light but sophisticated anti-aircraft weapon, their congressional friends vigorously pressed the case with the Reagan administration. They argued that the mujahedeen's need was greater than any trouble breaching the fiction of US involvement in Afghanistan might cause with the Soviets. Moscow, they said, was well aware of the US role, which by then had become an open secret. At first, Zia was reluctant to have the Afghans receive Stingers When pressed by mujahedeen backer Orrin Hatch; however, Pakistan's president asked that the weapon be supplied. After considerable internal debate, the Reagan administration agreed, overriding Defense Department and intelligence community concerns about "leakage" of the Stingers into the hands of terrorists and the possibility that the Soviets could copy the technology through reverse engineering. In September 1986, the Stinger claimed its first helicopter victim; thereafter.

Soviet losses mounted substantially. Helicopter pilots became more cautious, reducing the effectiveness of the gunships. Morale soared among the mujahedeen. In retrospect, introduction to the Stinger proved a major turning point in the Afghan struggle.

In mid-1986, when Bill Casey gave instruction to the officer assigned to take over as the chief of station in Islamabad, the CIA director no longer talked just of causing pain for the Soviets by 'growing the war." He emphatically ordered the new station chief to do everything possible to increase the military pressure on the Soviets in Afghanistan and "to win the war. "In the same spirit, the Congress approved doubling the level of US. Funding for the covert program from, $ 300 million to $600 million annually. With Saudi Arabia's matching contribution, this meant that by the end of 1986 more than $1 billion a year in supplies was being pumped into Pakistan for the insurgents. This was enough, according to a senior CIA official, to arm some four hundred thousand afghan resistance fighters.[15]

As the soviets appeared increasingly bogged down and unable to gain the upper hand in Afghanistan, observers began to think that Moscow might actually decide to pull out. After a visit to Islamabad by Soviet diplomats, Zia told Diego Cordova that "a miracle" might be possible.[16] *During another round of talks in March 1987, the Pakistanis and the Afghans substantially narrowed the gap between their respective timetables for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Afghans reduced the period for the Red Army's departure from four years to eighteen months. Yaqub increased the time that Pakistan was willing to accept from four to seven months. Cordova, who had by then reached agreement on less contentious elements of an afghan accord, "sensed the negotiations had finally acquired needed credibility and respectability".*

During the December 1987 US soviet summit in Washington, gorbachev publicly announced that soviet troops would leave over a twelve month period after agreement was reached on ending external aid to the mujahedeen. He no longer insisted on a political settlement as a condition for the departure of soviet forces. The road seemed open for an agreement, but as the withdrawal of the soviet army from Afghanistan became more likely, US and Pakistani interests began to diverge. According to arm cost, our main interest was getting the Russians out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from major US Concerns. The United States was not much interested

in the internal afghan setup and did not have much capacity to understand this". In contrast, the Pakistanis, especially president, Zia regarded the nature of the government in Kabul of major importance. According to Arnold Rappel, who had succeeded Hinton as US ambassador in 1987, the United States focused on the soviet withdrawal "while Zia and the ISI…. Felt that after eight years of war Pakistan was entitled to run its own show in Kabul.

To complicate matters, Pakistanis policy began to lose coherence just as the endgame of the Geneva negotiations commenced. Friction between Zia and Jungejo led to the resignation of the suave and experienced Yaqub Khan, who had stepped down in the fall of 1987 rather than have his deputy, Zia Noorani, a Jungejo supporter, head Pakistan delegation to the UN general assembly, upon Yaqubs departure, Noorani, who posed scant foreign affairs experience, became foreign minister. Although Zia had previously orchestrated afghan policy he was forced to work with the Jungejo dominated foreign minister, which did not always see things the presidents' way. Zia grew increasingly frustrated as development began to slip out of his control.

At this point, Pakistanis President threw a spanner in the works by threatening not to sign the Geneva accords unless there was a political settlement in Kabul. The action reversed Pakistanis long standing position that the only major issue to be negotiated at Geneva was the timetable for the departure of soviet troops. Although conventional wisdom held that the Communist regime, headed by Najib ullah Khan who had replaced Barack Kamal in 1986, would quickly collapse after the Soviet military departed, Zia was not so sure, according to Refaqat.[17] *In a strictly intra afghan struggle, Zia was uncertain whether the fractious mujahedeen would gain the upper hand and did not think that Najibullah would simply fade away. Zia expected that, instead Najib ullah would fight hard to retain power. Under these circumstances, Zia hoped to force a political settlement while the superpowers were still engaged. Lanced foreign policy and a strong defense. When Zia had begun Pakistan's support for the mujahedeen; his aim had been to reduce the likelihood that Moscow would push further south. As a Soviet withdrawal became a teal possibility, Zia's intuitions expanded. Victory by the resistance, he believed, could produce for the first time since*

1947 an Afghan regime genuinely friendly to Pakistan, which in turn would enable Pakistan to gain "strategic depth'' against India, long a goal of Pakistani military planners. Moreover, Zia hoped that the new government in Kabul would relied his own Islamic leanings far more than any previous Afghan regime had, and far more titan the Pakistani president had been able to impost' on his own country. [18]

In July 1986, Prime Minister Jugnejo visited the United States, providing the Reagan administration a chance to applaud Pakistan's more open political system aid to reaffirm the bilateral partnership. The most tangible sign was US willingness to provide $4.02 billion worth of aid over the next six years, While the earlier multiyear assistance package (1981—86) had been equally divided between military and economic assistance, at suggestion, 57 percent of the new six-year commitment (1987—93) would be for development aid and only 43 percent for security assistance. The Junejo visit also offered yet another opportunity for US. Officials, to stress the importance of Pakistani "restraint on the nuclear issue if. the United States is] to be able to continue multiyear program of economic and security assistance".

The prime minister, in fact, had little voice in the management of the nuclear program. In talking with Americans, he hewed strictly to — official line that it was "purely for peaceful purposes," In a meeting at the Washington Post, however, Junejo wandered off the reservation when he 'confirmed" that Pakistan would not enrich uranium beyond the 5 percent level mentioned in Reagan's September 1984 letter. Zia, himself, was always careful to avoid making an explicit commitment on the level of enrichment, falling back on his mantra, "We won't embarrass our friends".

In October I 986, President Reagan certified lot the first time under the Dressler amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and that American aid "reduces significantly" the risk that Pakistan would acquire one. A few days later, Washington was jarred by leaked intelligence reports indicating that Pakistan had tested a triggering device for a nuclear weapon and had enriched uranium to weapons grade. The press quoted an anonymous US official as saying that Pakistan was only "two screwdriver turns" away from possessing a fully assembled weapon. Still, according to Undersecretary of state for political affairs Michael arm cost the key state department official dealing with Afghanistan), there was enough doubt in

the intelligence community to enable the administration to avoid imposing sanctions under the Presley amendment: "There was no smoking gun and the fact of differences among the intelligence analysis pointed to the uncertainty".

Some months earlier, in September 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had advised secretary of state Shultz privately that soviet troops would leave Afghanistan within a year. During the December 1987 US soviet summit in Washington, gorbachev publicly announced that soviet troops would leave over a twelve-month period after agreement was reached on ending external aid to the mujahedeen. He no longer insisted on a political settlement as a condition for the departure of soviet forces. The road seemed open for an agreement, but as the withdrawal of the soviet army from Afghanistan became more likely, US and Pakistani interests began to diverge. According to arm cost, our main inte4rest was getting the Russians out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from major US Concerns. The United States was not much interested in the internal afghan setup and did not have much capacity top understand this". In contrast, the Pakistanis, especially president Zia, regarded the nature of the government in Kabul of major importance. According to Arnold rappel, who had succeeded Hinton as US ambassador in 1987, the United States focused on the soviet withdrawal "while Zia and the ISI…. Felt that after eight years of war Pakistan was entitled to run its own show in Kabul. [19]

To complicate matters, Pakistanis policy began to lose coherence just as the endgame of the Geneva negotiations commenced. Friction between Zia and Junejo led to the resignation of the suave and experienced Yaqub Khan, who had stepped down in the fall of 1987 rather than have his deputy, Zain Noorani, a Junejo supporter, head Pakistan delegation to the UN general assembly, upon Yaqubs departure, Noorani, who posed scant foreign affairs experience, became foreign minister. Although Zia had previously orchestrated afghan policy he was forced to work with the Junejo dominated foreign minister, which did not always see things the president's way. Zia grew increasingly frustrated as development began to slip out of his control.

At this point, Pakistanis president threw a spanner in the works by threatening not to sign the Geneva accords unless there was a political settlement in Kabul. The action reversed Pakistanis long standing position

that the only major issue to be negotiated at Geneva was the timetable for the departure of soviet troops. Although conventional wisdom held that the Communist regime, headed by Najibullah Khan who had replaced Babrak Karmal in 1986, would quickly collapse after the Soviet military departed, Zia was not so sure, according to Refaqat.[20] In a strictly intra afghan struggle, Zia was uncertain whether the fractious mujahedeen would gain the upper hand and did not think that Najibullah would simply fade away. Zia expected that, instead Najibullah would fight hard to retain power. Under these circumstances, Zia hoped to force a political settlement while the superpowers were still engaged.

Pakistan's willingness to play the role of frontline state during the afghan war appealed to Americas anti soviet penchant. The role proved costly to Pakistan in political and social terms, but the dividends were considerable in military and economic terms. By assuming the burden of 3.5 million refugees Pakistan earned international praise as a model host country in the midst of an international crisis. Islamabad's willingness to host factions of the afghan resistance and permit supplies to pass through Pakistan into Afghanistan endeared her to the west and in the Islamic bloc.

Pakistani and Americans interests converged, albeit for different reasons. The soviet occupation of Afghanistan made Islamabad understandably nervous and concerned over its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Likewise, anti-Communist sentiments in the United States were troubled over Soviet expansion in South Asia. Pakistan's concerns merged with America's anti Soviet zeal to bond an often stormy relationship between the two countries. [21]

Following the Second World War, America pursued its policy of was that healthy and thriving market economies in Western Europe would naturally reject the Soviet model and help check Soviet expansion.

A similar policy was at work in US-Pakistan relations during the period under review. The obvious difference is that Europe was reconstructing war damaged industrial economies whereas Pakistan is a pre industrials country. Nevertheless, a two front approach was taken in America's relations with Pakistan. Sizeable dos of military equipment to provide the means for security were mixed with financial assistance to help Pakistan's developing economy.[22]

In March 1987, the Reagan administration appealed to Congress for

increased aid to Pakistan. The appeal came at a time when the budget deficit was a major concern and it was becoming increasingly difficult to justify spending on foreign aid. It was also a time when Pakistan's nuclear program was coming under criticism.

The military component of the package included F-16s, ground based air defense radar. Sidewinder and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, reconditioned M-48 tanks, armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery. This assistance was also meant to upgrade Pakistan's armed forces which preponderantly consisted of aging Chinese and French equipment. Because of congressional opposition, the Reagan administration failed, however, in its attempt to provide Islamabad with an airborne early warning defense system to be deployed on the Afghan border and meant to provide Pakistan with the capability to anticipate the increasing number of incursions that had been taking place from behind the most mountainous parts of the frontier with Afghanistan.

In perhaps the most telling dimension of the assistance package, the Reagan administration asked congress to waive the Symington amendment and make an exception regarding Islamabad's controversial nuclear program (Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT). Aid would continue and Pakistan could proceed with nuclear research shy of detonating a nuclear device.[23]

On January 15, 1988, President Reagan signed a paper and sent to congress waivers to the law that would require a suspension in aid to Pakistan under the Symington and Solar Amendments because of activities in the area of nuclear weapons development. This waiver was based on the recognition that disrupting US-Pakistan relations would be counterproductive for the strategic interests of the United States, destabilizing for South Asia and unlikely to achieve the nonproliferation objectives sought by the US[24]

The United States has faced political and strategic dilemmas in its relations with Pakistan. How to pursue nuclear non-proliferation (an area in which Washington and Moscow agreed upon for decades) without pressing so hard as to jeopardize Pakistan's support in the war against the soviet occupation of Afghanistan? This contradiction resurfaced with full force in July 1987, when a Philadelphia federal court levied charges against

Arshad Pervaiz, a Pakistan living in Canada, for allegedly seeking to buy 50,000 pounds of a special steel allow used in nuclear enrichment facilities. The dilemma was resolved in favors of strategic interests. The Symington amendment was compromised; Pakistan's nuclear program proceeded apace and American military and economic aid continued unabated. [25]

The strategy which the Regan administration used to circumvent the Symington amendment hinged on its ability to influence Pakistani policies. While arguing the merits of the amendment and nuclear non-proliferation, the administration claimed that without sufficient aid to Pakistan, the United States would lack influence over Islamabad's nuclear decision making. Washington's willingness to tolerate Pakistan's nuclear program, demonstrated the importance the US placed in Pakistan's position in South Asia and in the role it was playing in the afghan crisis. An administration official noted:

Whatever influence we have over the thrust and direction of Pakistan's nuclear activities derives from our strong security links. Any action which would cut off, curtail, or cast doubt on the continuation of our assistance would be counterproductive, because it would grievously undercut our influence over Pakistan's nuclear decision making. We therefore urge the congress to act favorably on our request to extend for the duration of our following up aid package the authorization provided in section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act to waive the Symington amendment sanctions that would otherwise apply to Pakistan.[26]

On March 5, 1987 Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, went before the House Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee to present a proposed $4 billion package of military and economic aid. Peck noted in his testimony that Pakistan was an important Islamic state of over 100 million that had maintained relatively good relations with the United States and deserved the new aid proposal for 1988. In 1981, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan agreed to a $3.2 billion multi-year program of assistance. The aim of this assistance was to give Pakistan the instruments of security and help its developing economy Peck noted that:

With American support, Pakistan has grown stronger and more secure … while continuing to pursue policies which have kept the idea of Afghan freedom alive. Six years ago the congress was asked to take on faith the twin

propositions that Pakistan would have the courage to stand up over time to Soviet intimidation and that the afghan people, like their forebears, would never accept a foreign occupation, even one backed up by the terrible weapons of modern warfare. We return to the congress this year confident that the record speaks for itself. We have kept our commitments to Pakistan and to the Afghan people, and they, in turn, have kept their own commitments to their national traditions, their future generations and to the very concept of freedom itself.

Pakistan remains vital to the prosecution of an effective policy of opposition to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan. Pakistan remains on the front lines, a victim of increasing air and ground attacks across its borders, as well as of terrorist bombings and sabotage within. Pakistan continues to provide compassionate refuge for nearly three million Afghans who continue to flee the devastation in their own country. Pakistan's leadership in rallying world opinion against the Soviet occupation remains as important as ever. These are, of course, Pakistan's policies, pursued because they are clearly in Pakistan's own national interest. But our support helps reinforce Pakistan's principled stand. Congressional action on the administration's proposals will provide a timely reminder that we share the objectives of Pakistan policies.

Our security assistance has helped Pakistan to undertake a limited but long overdue modernization of its armed forces, with special reference to improving capabilities to deter and defeat threats emanating from Afghanistan.[27]

In appealing for aid to Pakistan, the Reagan administration demonstrated that assistance was directly linked to Islamabad's willingness to participate in reversing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As in past US foreign policy initiatives, economic relations were also meant to serve security interests.

In order to help Pakistan to develop its economy, the US promoted private sector development by encouraging Islamabad to reduce subsidies in food, energy, transportation and agriculture. In many cases, aid was contingent on domestic reforms that reversed the government's role in the economy. At the same time, by meeting these conditions Pakistan qualified for IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank funds directed primarily

at the private sector.

In 1988, the Reagan administration structured a six year package of $4 billion. The first aid package for Pakistan (1981) had been 50% economic and development assistance and 50% concessional foreign military sales. The 1988 package, however, provided 57% for economic assistance and 43% in military assistance. The second package was structured on concessional terms meant to avoid aggravating Pakistan's debt burden.

The economic assistance included developed of the poor but strategically important western provinces of the federally administered Tribal Areas, the North West Frontier province, and Baluchistan. It was in these areas bordering Afghanistan that tensions could arise from the concentration of refugees and pressures on the infrastructure. Moreover, these areas historically have been centers of separatist sentiments and tribal conflicts which could be destabilizing to the country. [28]

Coinciding with American aid to Pakistan was Washington's push for policy reforms and private sector development. These succeeded in achieving such policies as: reduced monopoly control of the Ghee corporation of Pakistan in buying cotton seed oil (edible oil accounts for 10% of imports), the private sector share of imported fertilizer distribution increased from less than 10% to 50% with a goal of 60%, reduced restrictions on private sector edible oil imports, deregulation of production and distribution of nitrogenous fertilizer, progressively increased water rates until operation and maintenance costs were completely covered; raise in consumer gas prices to near market prices, development of a national energy conservation plan; detraining of wheat, and a national contraceptives sale program.

The United States agency for international development (USID) was the largest donor to Pakistan followed by Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank of $954.2 million in development aid to Pakistan in 1988. USID accounted for $ 205 million or 21%. USID had the largest technical staff of any donor in Pakistan and cooperated with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in financing projects and setting the conditionality attached to projects. Along with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the US has financed projects in irrigation, energy and farm water management projects including the 350 megawatt Guddu plant.

During 1988-1993, subject to annual congressional approvals, the

second package was to provide an additional $2.28 billion for funding development projects including $ 1.8 billion (79% of the package) in the form of outright grant assistance. The remaining $480 million (21% of the package) was earmarked to import needed agricultural items under the highly concessional PL-480 program.

DIMENSIONS OF PAK-US RELATIONS AFTER AFGHAN WAR

Nine years and forty-nine days after the soviet troops marched into Afghanistan, they completed their withdrawal on 15 February 1989. Almost simultaneously the US lost interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US locked its embassy in Kabul because of the absence of law and order there, and the war that started between the seven militias (the so called Mujahidin), who failed to share power with each other. The Mujahedeen's conflict in reality was an ethnic struggle between the Pashtuns and five major minority ethnic groups.

US relations with Pakistan soured over the nuclear issue. A series of sanctions were imposed which made life for Pakistan quite difficult. With American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan found the latter very receptive to its influence and very helpful in sustaining the struggle for Kashmir. Pakistan began to play its role independently of US concerns, and perceived Afghanistan as its 'strategic depth'. Here these issues are discussed, the geostrategic environment at the global level, which led the US to withdraw its interest from Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban and the emergence of a failed state, strained relations between the US and Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

The period of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo (1985–1988) marked a transitional phase in Pakistan–U.S. relations, characterized by strategic convergence but persistent underlying contradictions. Junejo sought to project civilian authority by restoring constitutional order, lifting martial law, and emphasizing democratic governance, yet his foreign policy remained intertwined with U.S. strategic objectives in the Cold War context. The Afghan war created a strong basis of cooperation: Pakistan provided crucial logistical and political support to the U.S.-backed Mujahidin, while Washington extended multi-billion-dollar aid packages blending military and economic assistance.

Despite these convergences, bilateral ties were strained by U.S.

concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program and by divergences in Afghan policy. Junejo's candid acknowledgment of uranium enrichment levels contrasted with Zia's deliberate ambiguity, creating moments of discomfort in Washington. The Geneva Accords of 1988, though facilitating Soviet withdrawal, revealed the differing priorities of Islamabad and Washington: the U.S. was focused on expelling Soviet forces, while Pakistan, especially its military establishment, sought to shape a post-Soviet Kabul aligned with its own strategic depth doctrine.

Ultimately, Junejo's tenure underscored the structural dilemmas of Pakistan–U.S. relations. While strategic necessity fostered close cooperation, long-term mistrust persisted over nuclear proliferation, aid conditionality, and divergent endgames in Afghanistan. The post-Soviet disengagement of the U.S. and the reemergence of sanctions soon after highlighted the fragility of this alliance. The Junejo era thus remains a defining episode, illustrating both the opportunities and limitations of Pakistan's partnership with the United States at a critical historical juncture.

Despite this cooperation, divergences gradually surfaced. The United States prioritized a swift Soviet withdrawal and the containment of nuclear proliferation, whereas Pakistan's leadership—especially its military establishment—sought to secure a favorable post-Soviet order in Afghanistan and maintain strategic autonomy. These conflicting priorities, coupled with U.S. conditionality's under the Pressler Amendment, exposed the fragile foundations of the partnership.

Finally, the Junejo era demonstrated both the opportunities and limitations of Pak–U.S. relations. The partnership was strong in moments of shared strategic necessity but vulnerable to mistrust whenever national interests diverged. The post-Soviet U.S. disengagement and subsequent sanctions reinforced this cyclical pattern. Thus, Junejo's tenure remains a critical episode that underscores the complex interplay between Pakistan's domestic political evolution and its external alliances during a decisive moment in the Cold War.

References

[1]Muhammad Rafique, Asdim Farooq Sheikh, *Standard History of Pakistan Since 1947-2008*: *Thoroughly Revised and Updated.* Lahore: Govt. Islamia College Civil Lines, 2012.396-97

[2] Khan, Muhammad Bahar, Saad Jaffar, Imran Naseem, Muhammad Waseem Mukhtar, and Waqar Ahmed. "Nature Of 21 st Century's Global Conflicts Under The Global Powers' Geoeconomic Strategies And Islamic Ideology For Peace." *Journal of Positive School Psychology* 7, no. 4 (2023).

[3]Rasanayagam Angelo, *Afghanistan: A Modern Study,* London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2011, 116-

[4]Riaz M. Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal,* Durham: Duke University Press, 1991,147-149.

[5] Khan, Muhammad Bahar, Saad Jaffar, Shazia Sajid, Waqar Ahmed Amaria Atta, and Muhammad Waseem Mukhtar. "Alone Atomic Islamic State Pakistan's Significant Geo-Political Location For Super Powers Monopole Strategies Cultivation." *Kurdish Studies* 12, no. 4 (2024): 1537-41.

[6] Afghanistan: Partial Solution, Background Brief, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, May 1988; Robin Pauley,' When the Red Army Leaves the War stays' Financial times,London,6 February,1989.

[7] Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot*, Op, Cit, 257-60.

[8]Afghanistan: Soviet Media Coverage', Background Brief, Foreign and Commonwealth office, London, August 1987.

[9] Ibid.

[10] K. Ziem, 'An Interim Report on the Situation in Afghanistan, in Aussenpolitik, 1S, 1989, 43-44.

[11] Afghanistan: One Year Late. *The Economist*, 10 February, 1990.

[12] Christina Lamb, Kabul Ox, Turns Faces Red in Washington, The Financial Times, 15 May,1989.

[13]Simon Tisdal,'US Changes Strategy in Fight to Topple Najibullah',*The Guardian,* London: 4 September,1989 quoted in.

[14]Cordovez and Harrison, Op, Cit, 226.

[15] A senior CIA official estimated that only about forty thousand Afghans were actually fighting at any one time, or one tenth of the number for whom arms were provided. .

[16]Cordovez and Harrison, Untying the Afghan Knot, 274-75.

[17] Rasanayagam Angelo, Op, Cit, 120-122.

[18] Ibid. 125-128.

[19]Cordovez and Harrison, Untying the Afghan Knot, 274-75.

[20] Muhammad Rafique, Op, Cit, 402-407.

[21] M. Raziullah Azmi, Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past, Karachi: Royal Book Company,1994,16-17.

[22]Wallis Allen, W. U.S. Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, in a speech to the Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Published in Department of State Bulletin, January 1986,52.

[23]Pellertreau Robert H. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, and Robert Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, testifying before the house Foreign Affairs Sub Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, March 5,1987.

[24]A Statement released January 15, 1988,by the Office of the Press Secretary for the President, Unclassified and Made available for immediate release.

[25]Murphy Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for near East and South Asian Affairs, Testimony to a joint committee of two house subcommittees on July 22,1987.

[26]Peck Robert A. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, testifying to a House Sub Committee hearing on aid to Pakistan, March 5, 1987.

[27]Khan, Muhammad Bahar, Saad Jaffar, Sardar Muhammad, Muhammad Waseem Mukhtar, Waqar Ahmad, and Bushra Rasheed. "Partitioning the subcontinent in 1947: A move of west against the stability of Islam using applicable geopolitical laws." *Russian Law Journal* 11, no. 1 (2023): 157-165.

[28]M. RaziullahAzmi, Op.Cit.,21-22.