

Regional Security Implications by China's Rise: A research review

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Abstract

The importance of the Indian Ocean was highlighted by the American maritime strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in the Nineteenth century. Geo-strategically, India has numerous advantages in the Indian Ocean and its Sagarmala project is poised to bring enhanced port connectivity; nonetheless, China is rapidly closing the gap of such an advantage. Likewise, India is establishing its foothold in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea (SCS) using multilateral agreements such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad. With New Delhi's such endeavors, the already competitive environment in the SCS is likely to flare up. The paper aspires to investigate not only the disputes between the Asian giants as the two countries such as China and India are trying to dominate the Indian Ocean. India has a traditional advantage in the Indian Ocean, but China is also trying to counter Indian dominance in the Indian Ocean. India's strategy of getting involved in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes as an indirect party has raised concerns in China. India is exploiting the resources of the SCS within Vietnam's EEZ, even as China raised concerns about such activity from India. It concluded that if India blocked China's commerce from the SCS, it would seriously impede China's economic progress. Its trade will be greatly reduced. It should also be noted that India prefers a more strategic location in the Indian Ocean, but given the technological superiority that China has achieved over the past several decades, it seems likely that the Indian Navy could cause threat to the Chinese navy and thus has the potential to create an impediment to Chinese commerce.

Keywords: American maritime, Geo-strategically, Indian Ocean,

China, India.

INTRODUCTION

India and China, within a few years of achieving independence, the two nations were engaged in border wars; hence, military growth was centered on military development.¹ During this historical period, the military was regarded as the spearhead of national security. The overemphasis on the army has resulted in the underdevelopment of the air force and navy, and all the resources primarily dedicated to the development of the armed forces are used to purchase army-specific weaponry. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the US entry in the war to assist its ally Taiwan, Chinese strategists realized for the first time that their naval capabilities were inferior to those of their opponents and that they needed to upgrade their navy immediately. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States Navy deployed an aircraft carrier task force, thwarting any Chinese attempt to launch an amphibious or close-in operation. This is a significant loss for Chinese strategists. The two navies have a strategic vision for power creation in the Indian Ocean in the next years, particularly in places where it is in their best interests, such as the South China Sea (SCS). China and India have collaborated to increase strategic depth for the projection of strength from the shore to the sea. China and India's maritime strategies have always placed a significant emphasis on maritime deterrence. Today, naval planners in China and India are closely observing the post-Cold War developments in which the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France shifted large portions of their nuclear arsenals to their submarines, thereby vying for dominion over the world's oceans. Today, India and China also place a significant emphasis on aircraft carrier construction. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant is currently under construction in India and will be commissioned in 2020. It will be the first Indian-built aircraft carrier. The aircraft carrier is one of the most vital instruments of power projection able to launch aircraft in support of combat operations. In addition to establishing sea containment zones, sea control, and long-range strike operations, it can play numerous other roles.

China has endeavored to acquire aircraft carriers, particularly since the 1970s. China did not have an aircraft carrier in the 1970s. Now, not only does the Chinese Navy, or PLA Navy, own an aircraft carrier, but it also intends to develop indigenous aircraft carriers. China possessed one fully operational and combat-capable aircraft carrier in 2018, with two more under construction. China has anticipated to operate 5 to 6 aircraft carriers by 2030.² These developments are part of China's "active offshore defense strategy" and are intended to enhance the country's reputation as a regional superpower. These steps will guarantee that the PLA Navy will not be overpowered by other navies in the Indian Ocean,

particularly the SCS. In addition, a strong navy would aid in the planning of national defense. With more than 300,000 naval personnel and more than 100 vessels, warships, and submarines, the Chinese Navy is the largest naval power in the Asia-Pacific region and is therefore able to deter and conduct robust naval operations.³ The Indian Navy is currently the third strongest navy in the Asia-Pacific area in terms of inventory and strength, behind China and Japan. The Indian Navy consists of about 80,000 personnel and possesses over 150 small, medium, and large ships as well as submarines.⁴

Economic Implications

The SCS has been a significant trading route for decades, in the 21st century, it has become one of the largest commerce routes in the world. More than 60 percent of China's total commerce and more than 40 percent of Japan's total trade were estimated to have passed through the South China Sea in 2016.⁵ Even though the United States is located far from the South China Sea, over 14% of U.S. marine traffic also goes through these areas, demonstrating the country's dependence on the sea. The US commerce with SCS exceeds \$200 billion, Germany at \$215 billion, and France at \$85 billion in terms of SCS trade.⁶ It is anticipated that European nations' trade in the SCS will increase in the future years.

The Malacca Dilemma

It should be noted that sea lanes are also geostrategic regions, that they are vital to the conduct of all economic and commercial activities, and that the economy of a country is directly tied to the sea lanes.⁷ Straits and chokepoints are equally important as sea routes, and in some cases considerably more so. In order to utilize specific shipping lanes, it is necessary to cross the strait. The Strait of Malacca, which is owned and controlled by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, is a prime example of the significance of these countries' strategic position in the context of the Strait of Malacca.⁸ These transport-safe, cost-effective, and short sea routes are always preferred by commercial ships, as they are extremely concerned with freight costs. In times of peace, sea lanes served as trade channels, and in times of conflict, naval strategy was devised to safeguard the sea lanes. Is this the case? In the formation of maritime strategy, there is thus a direct relationship between geography and navigation. Japan, which thinks that sea lanes must be preserved up to 1,000 nautical miles from its coast, is a prime illustration of this occurrence. We are all aware that the SCS would be included in a hypothetical territory extending from the coast of Japan to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles. This implies that the interests of the overlapping countries in the SCS are in dispute. India and Japan are not direct parties to hostilities in the South China Sea, but they have a national interest in safeguarding sea lanes across the contested SCS.

Defence Spending

In the past two years, China's economy has expanded at a staggering pace. A few years ago, it grew at a rate of 9 % a year, which was the highest in the world. Currently, its growth rate is around 7%.⁹ China has the largest standing army armed with the most advanced military equipment, and its defense budget is rising. Since the 1990s, China's economy and defense budget have surged significantly, and given the rate of economic development, it is expected that the Chinese navy will be able to upgrade without problem. The Chinese government is eager to invest in naval modernization and has budgeted billions of dollars for equipment and training. The link between military spending and economic growth has long been a subject of dispute among Chinese policymakers.

Chinese policymakers argue that by overpaying on defense in the early years after independence, they stifled economic growth and overspent on the military, which would not have been able to keep up with a weak economy. In the 1950s, for instance, the military expenditure comprised 42% of GDP due to the Korean War. Even in the 1970s, the defense spending exceeded 20% of GDP.¹⁰ China's defense budget continued to drop from the 1970s through the 1990s, although economic development was a primary priority. Due to the fact that economic development was not the primary objective, it has already begun to expand, but the policy has substantially damaged the defense modernization process. As the economy began to grow in the 1990s, so did defense spending. In 2008, defense spending reached 417 billion yuan, an increase of 67 billion yuan from the previous year. 2008 was a notable year since defense spending climbed dramatically.¹¹ This increase is justified by arguing that it is not designed to modernize the military, but rather to boost the price of oil and the salaries of the armed services, and that it poses no threat to other nations because China is a peaceful nation. China's priority is on economic development, not military development, and it has no aspirations to become a hegemon, and that is the Chinese claim in response to their neighbors' concerns. However, China's leaders are adamant that modernizing their military, and particularly their navy, is essential for maintaining the security and readiness of sea channels of communication. monetary activity. It is only possible to accomplish and maintain sustainable development if there are active maritime traffic routes that do not impede the movement of commodities and energy.

The U.S. Factor

The United States has a long-standing partnership with the Philippines in the SCS. For this reason, the Philippines has acquired a substantial amount of the required military equipment from the United States. Taiwan, an island republic in the SCS, also has a very tight relationship

with the United States since the United States sends weaponry to Taiwan; hence, the Chinese government is always vehemently hostile to Taiwan. Chinese policymakers anticipate that Taiwanese armament shipments will wreak havoc in the South China Sea (SCS) and disturb the status quo.¹² The Chinese continue to view that the status quo is advantageous for China, since it is still important for keeping peace in the South China Sea (SCS). If the status quo is disturbed by the delivery of weapons and equipment to any country in the South China Sea, which is likely to occur if difficulties intensify, the Chinese military has always attempted to dominate the SCS and then utilize this military supremacy for political ends. One of the most significant missions assigned to the Chinese navy is the protection of energy- and matter-dependent marine communication cables.

Modern Chinese-developed missiles are able to incapacitate Taiwan's military, and these missiles will be employed prior to the navy's use of these missiles. Hundreds of China's most advanced missiles are now directed at Taiwan. China is expanding the number of missiles it has deployed towards Taiwan as tensions between the two countries reach unprecedented heights. These missiles are not merely designed to be a threat; the Chinese will deploy them, if necessary, as was the case during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-1955, when they were employed.¹³ This projectile Taiwan was the first country in the SCS to acquire a Patriot missile defense system from the United States, however this is an operational crisis as China still has access to hundreds of missiles that may be launched simultaneously. obscure. During the previous year, China took necessary measures to ensure that Taiwan would not be able to break a naval blockade and refuse all requests from China if one were to be imposed on Taiwan.

To eliminate the possibility of US intervention, China cannot proclaim hostile activities against Taiwan, but it can cause financial damage. As a result, they are able to execute a "national naval blockade" by burying their assets and therefore posing a virtual danger to ships approaching or leaving Taiwanese ports. This will have a negative effect on Taiwan's economy, as international insurance organizations will boost their risk assessment of commerce ships sailing from Taiwanese ports. The Chinese navy also has the technological capabilities to lay mines at sea, which may be denounced by international organizations such as the United Nations. However, if China chooses this course of action, it will not be sufficient to dissuade foreign nations. The Taiwan Strait is traversed by merchant vessels.

In 2017, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated

*"The United States must give China a strong message to terminate its invasion of the South China Sea."*¹⁴

This situation has significant geopolitical implications for the United States. In this field, the United States has many partners. In response to escalating tensions in the South China Sea, the United States has agreed to enhance its support for its ally, the Philippines. In light of escalating tensions and increased threats to the Philippines, the two nations have agreed to advance their defense ties to the next level.

James Mattis expressed caution on the SCS.

"Without China's direct participation, he said, the United States should take all necessary efforts to ensure freedom of navigation for all states."¹⁵

China has long opposed the U.S. presence in the disputed region, but the U.S. is collaborating with SCS nations on a variety of realistic options. It is reasonable to conclude that the United States will continue to back its allies and maintain freedom of navigation while pursuing its objectives in the SCS.

SCS and Russia

Many nations in the South China Sea have trading links with Russia. In recent years, there has been a trend toward a rise in trade volume. Russia is reviving its former connection with Vietnam and is now establishing itself as one of Vietnam's largest supporters. Russia provides Vietnam with modern arms and collaborates with Vietnam on other economic and commercial matters. Zhang Mingliang, a professor at Zhang University, said that:

"Russia is Vietnam's biggest supporter in the East Sea. Besides, Russia has also become one of the biggest supporters of the Philippines in the South China Sea. Although China and Russia have held joint exercises in the South China Sea, but the two countries are still not on the same page."¹⁶

Russia's actions also support this assertion. In this way, it is expanding its ties with the countries bordering the South China Sea. Russia is also expanding defense ties with other countries in southern China.

Political Implications

Post-independence, a 10-year naval growth plan was examined, and it was agreed that two modern naval fleets, one for the Arabian Sea and one for the Bay of Bengal, would be established.¹⁷ Many people believe that the Indian Ocean Navy's objective is to oppose China's and other great countries' expanding interests in the Indian Ocean in the twenty-first century, however this is certainly misleading because the Navy's plan is to develop an Indian Ocean Army. Clear the waters from its first ten-year naval growth plan for decades, Indian naval strategists have questioned the use of aircraft carriers, as they can perform a number of tactical missions, enhancing the navy's capabilities. Carriers may also serve as a formidable deterrent against any foe, which is critical in Indian

naval doctrine. Even in peacetime, the value of aircraft carriers and their power to influence political events cannot be overstated. India's naval strategy supports for having influence in the region, as influence, to some extent, may be quite effective in creating amicable ties. Carriers can also be helpful in this area. Furthermore, the aircraft carrier is important to the Indian Navy's maritime warfare philosophy. In 1961, India purchased an aircraft carrier from Britain, which it effectively employed against Pakistan during the 1971 war. India had planned to purchase more aircraft carriers from the market after the 1980s for political and technical reasons. The reasons for purchasing one from the United States are that India has close links with the Soviet Union, and it is extremely difficult to obtain an advanced aircraft carrier from the Soviet Union that is inferior to the one purchased by India for the United Kingdom.

Submarines, in addition to aircraft carriers, play important roles in Indian naval doctrine. India is anticipated to build at least 24 advanced submarines by 2025.¹⁸ India isn't just concerned with keeping adequate coastline forces. The Indian Navy's littoral force is primarily reliant on corvettes and considers them to be the lifeblood of operations. The Indian Navy as a whole, including the Brown Waters and Blue Waters Navy, is responsible with safeguarding India's interests in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The formidable Indian Navy is expected to play a key role in preserving India's interests in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea as events unfold.

India a Bid to Leadership

India is a country in the Indian Ocean with a very long coastline, and the Indian Ocean is the world's third largest ocean. Most of India's neighbors, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, are also marine states. India holds a critical geopolitical location in the Indian Ocean, with numerous vital shipping routes passing through Indian space and maritime zones. The fact that India is located exactly between the two largest bodies of water in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, and the Arabian Sea, demonstrates its accomplishment. Many key waterways are located within India's maritime interests and are both military and economic in nature. The Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Ten Degree Channel should be mentioned in addition to these sites. The strategically vital Andaman and Nicobar Island groups are separated by the Ten Degree Channel.¹⁹

The Strait of Hormuz is 20 nautical miles long and is regarded as one of the world's most important strategic chokepoints. Larger ships can also travel through this spot because it is deep enough. It is estimated that almost 88 % of Gulf oil shipments pass via this choke point.²⁰ Almost every oil ship in service throughout the world is claimed to sail through this strait at some point during the year. Second, the sea path from the

Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean also passes through the Indian Ocean.

Naval Exercises

The PLA Navy has been tasked with protecting China's maritime interests, particularly in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. It is quite conceivable that the Chinese Navy will actively assist in the protection of offshore islands in the near future. There have been no serious confirmations in the South China Sea (a disputed zone) in recent years, but the Chinese Navy is actively involved in defending its interests there. Because the US is expected to equip Taiwan with weapons, tensions between Taiwan and mainland China are likely to rise in the short term. Fighting is also predicted to rise in the South China Sea in the coming years. The Chinese Navy has previously engaged in skirmishes with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea over contested maritime regions.²¹

Disputes in the South China Sea have grown more heated in recent months. However, there are many uninhabited islands, which the claimants fear are at risk of being invaded by rival claimants. Because many of these islands are located far from the mainland, consolidating and occupying them will be difficult for the Chinese. A mission to capture these uninhabited islands would almost definitely necessitate a high level of operational readiness. It would also necessitate the most modern vessels and a significant amount of force, as China's competitors in the South China Sea have expanded the capabilities of their naval forces. There is no question that no other Chinese enemy in the South China Sea possesses the Chinese Navy's capability, but a response is undoubtedly necessary. The only doubt is the reaction of China's South China Sea opponents. To resist threats in the South China Sea, China has recently equipped itself with external equipment, purchasing modern aircraft, electronic warfare, and a huge number of aircraft arrays. supplied.

In addition, China has been conducting ongoing naval exercises in the South China Sea. It has carried out deployments, but it is unknown how effective this will be in the case of a major war in the South China Sea. In a situation when the opponent performs a better job of increasing soldiers, particularly naval capabilities The South China Sea contains smaller islands, and the occupiers have deployed military aircraft on several of them, such as Rancudo Airport on Philippine-occupied Sagasa Island and Swallow Reef and Layang, The Layang on Malaysian-occupied islands. The islands are also outfitted with a variety of military equipment. These islands can be used as aircraft carriers and for smaller VSTOL (vertical short-take-off and landing) military aircraft as necessary. VSTOLs may be particularly effective in South China Sea circumstances, as Argentina and the United Kingdom demonstrated in

the 1982 Falklands War.²²

There are currently no maritime states in South China (other than China) that are capable of hosting VSTOL aircraft, and these countries must rely on outside supplies in the case of a confrontation. Malaysia maintains tight defense connections with Russia and is continually attempting to purchase the MIG29, a purpose-built VSTOL. Malaysia was able to buy 16 Russian MIG29 fighters, although these were not VSTOL capable.²³ Russia will almost certainly offer Malaysia with a robust defense relationship between the two countries. While Malaysia maintains tight military ties with Russia and gets the majority of its weaponry from Russia, the Philippines (also a major claimant in the South China Sea) has a long history with the United States. As a result, the Philippines has gotten much of the required military equipment for its defense from the United States. Taiwan, an island republic in the South China Sea, also has a very tight relationship with the US, which has long been vehemently opposed by the Chinese government. Arms deliveries to Taiwan, according to Chinese policymakers, will cause instability in the South China Sea and disturb the status quo.

Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Implications

Maintaining a deterrence capacity is always critical for the Chinese navy. The Chinese Navy now has more corvettes, battleships, and submarines than its original competitors. This enables the Chinese navy to be a significant power in Asia, and nuclear submarines ensure that any misadventure by a large country can be dealt with decisively. The Chinese were keeping a close eye on the events of World War II, which saw the Japanese suffer greatly as a result of the United States' nuclear weapons. The Chinese believed that the value of nuclear capability is significant in international relations, and that if China does not want to be coerced by any external force, it must build its nuclear capabilities. Another advantage of possessing nuclear capability is that it increases courage and deters opponents. For the reasons stated above, China initiated its nuclear weapons program in 1955, and nearly nine years later, China conducted nuclear tests. China tested a nuclear missile in 1966, two years after completing nuclear tests.²⁴ The Soviet Union offered significant help to China during the program's early years, but due to differences between the two communist countries, the Soviet Union departed in the late 1950s.²⁵ As such, it was a significant setback to China's nuclear weapons development plans. Chinese leaders are unwilling to relinquish this effort because they believe that only China's nuclear energy can ensure China's strength.

China currently owns over 246 warheads, including 88 or more naval nuclear warheads.²⁶ The tendency is likely to accelerate the development of sea warheads, with roughly 200 marine warheads moving by 2020.

Furthermore, China places a high value on it. It believes that submarines will play a vital role in boosting China's status as a major maritime power, and hence in China's defense. It is worth noting that the sea-based missile defense system offers only limited protection against incoming ballistic missiles, in which case sea-based nuclear weapons are deployed on submarines. The possibility of a second attack, if necessary, is also significant.

Chinese strategists have traditionally emphasized nuclear submarine development as a strategy of becoming a surface power in the twenty-first century. According to the former Chinese admiral, constructing nuclear submarines will be China's most significant priority in the coming years as part of the country's new military strategy.²⁷ To complete the triad, China has established a force built around sea-based, land-based nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers, demonstrating that China has placed much too much emphasis on acquiring naval capabilities.

The Xia-class SSBN, which was built in China, is an example of one of China's prestigious submarines.²⁸ At the moment, China has only built one unit of this submarine. The PLAN possesses four armed submarines that can launch surface-to-surface missiles via torpedo tubes. With Russia's assistance, more submarines are being manufactured in the United States. The Russia-China connection has resulted in considerable Russian assistance for China's indigenous maritime industry development. In addition to creating a large number of submarines and warships, China is attempting to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in order to improve the capabilities of its navy.

India's proclaimed policy, initially announced in 1999, is "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons."²⁹ The world community understands that India is and will remain committed to (Non-First Utilize) NFU, is opposed to nuclear-weapon states, and does not use nuclear-weapon states. It is also said that NFU may not apply in the case of certain non-nuclear states seeking nuclear protection through agreements with nuclear-weapon states. According to India's nuclear policy, nuclear weapons are not only a weapon of subjugation but also a weapon of deterrence, and so they can only be employed for deterrence. It is not working. The Indian naval strategist argues that deterrence must be lethal enough that opponents understand that deterrent might deliver unacceptably significant damage at any time. designed for military use As a result, it is stated that any nuclear attack on India will result in a retaliatory strike with such force that the opponent will suffer irreparable harm. India has stated unequivocally that it will utilize nuclear weapons as a security instrument rather than a threat.

India purchased a nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union in 1988, and

it entered service the following year.³⁰ The submarine has been valuable in developing and testing indigenous nuclear submarine technology, in addition to serving as a training ground for Indian Navy troops. Although this submarine was not purchased by India and was merely leased for three years, the nuclear submarines were returned to the Soviet Union once the period expired. The indigenous nuclear submarine program's Advanced Technology boats began sea trials in 2009. The ATV (Advanced Technology Vesse) submarines each weigh 6,000 tons, and four of them are built in India.³¹

Naval Strategy

Since its inception in April 1949, the PLAN has gone through many ups and downs that have been moulded by internal and external dynamics, influencing strategy, force structure, and mission. In general, China's political leaders have long supported arming the navy in order for it to acquire maritime power status. In 1953, Chinese leader Mao stated that China's primary goal was to establish a strong navy to counter imperialist aggression. Chinese President Hu Jintao stated a few years ago that "China should try to create a powerful navy capable of adjusting to its historic purpose (becoming a superpower) in a new world." A new age and another new era He went on to say that the role of the Chinese Navy will be critical in protecting national security and jurisdiction, as well as upholding China's maritime rights (wherever they may be).

The concept of "Comprehensive Security" underpins India's defensive approach. Its complicated meaning can be seen as a comprehensive defense. The basic concept is that the Indian Navy will use deterrence rather than engage in a fast battle, but if the deterrence measures fail and the navy is forced to enter the conflict or disagreement, the Indian Navy will launch an attack on the enemy's region.³² The Indian Navy should be stationed outside the Andaman and Nicobar Islands group to prevent the enemy from entering the islands. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are strategically important because they may serve as an unsinkable aircraft carrier as well as a forward base for the Indian Navy. These islands can also serve as fighter aircraft shelters, missile battery storage, and logistical support for forces operating far from the mainland. It is vital to note that India's military marine strategy considers the Indian Ocean as the principal region of worry, but the South China Sea, East Pacific, and South Indian Ocean are the primary areas of concern, but the events occur in the south. It is anticipated in the South China Sea that if an adversary's activities hurt India's interests, secondary areas of worry will become core areas of concern.

Indian Navy strategists have always given the Indian Ocean great priority, and the Indian Navy has divided the Indian Ocean into three maritime space levels to be monitored in order to preserve security and

surveillance conditions. a wide range of relevant military equipment Drones controlled from shore and ship stations, for example, monitor nearby levels. However, such a large area of the Indian Ocean (roughly 74 million square meters) cannot be continuously monitored and necessitates ongoing cooperation from other major Indian Ocean actors such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia so that the capabilities of these navies can also be enhanced, and only then will such a large area be covered.

Deterrence is key to the Indian Navy's strategy, and if deterrence fails, the next duty will be to finish the conflict on favorable terms for India. If the enemy is strong, deterrence cannot be established with a single line of defense. In that circumstance, the backing of alliances and friendly countries is required to achieve a balance of power. For example, India currently lacks a naval force comparable to China's. As a result, India and its partners, Malaysia and Singapore, have reached an accord to resist China's expanding influence in the Indian Ocean. India is actively working on naval modernization, and it is projected that by 2022, India's naval fleet will include "160 warships or more," at least three modern aircraft carriers, and at least 400 aircraft of various types.³³ A positive aspect of the 2022 vision is that several surveillance satellites will be utilized by the Indian Navy, as will very advance networking equipment, the majority of which are manufactured by the Indian Navy.

Nicobar and Andaman Islands

Almost all Asian nations believe that colonial powers governed their domains by ignoring a powerful naval strength. The reasons for disregarding naval power development in China and India differ. Internal wars are a reason for China to overlook the coastlines; for India, various issues, including the lack of a common army, were reasons for colonial occupation of India's shores. Both China and India place a high value on the development of marine military capabilities so that they can deal with any external force intrusion in the future.

Within a few years of achieving independence from British imperial power, India and China, the two countries were embroiled in border warfare, and hence military development was prioritized.³⁴ At the time, the military was regarded as the forerunner of national security. Over-concentration on the army has resulted in underdevelopment of the air force and navy, and all resources primarily allocated to armed forces development have been used to purchase equipment primarily used by the army during the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the United States' intervention in the war to support its ally, Taiwan. This was the first time Chinese strategists felt they were inferior to their adversaries in terms of naval capability and that there was an urgent need to modernize the navy. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States Navy

deployed an aircraft carrier task force, preventing China from conducting an amphibious or close-in operation. This is a major setback for Taiwanese.

The Indian Navy suffered a huge loss during the 1965 war with Pakistan, as Indonesia dispatched a naval crew to aid Pakistan, posing a serious threat to the navy. The situation deteriorated further when the United States chose to back its partner Pakistan by dispatching Task Force 74 during the height of the Indo-Pak war in 1971.³⁵ As a result, a policy is implemented to upgrade India's navy against any external danger from the coast.

Aircraft Carriers and Security

China and India's navies share a strategic goal of projecting force in the Indian Ocean, particularly in areas of mutual interest, such as the South China Sea. China and India have collaborated to increase strategic depth in order to project power from coastal regions into the sea.

Maritime deterrence has long played a significant strategy in China and India's maritime strategies. Today, naval planners in China and India are closely watching post-Cold War developments in which the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France shifted major quantities of their nuclear arsenals to submarines, vying for domination over the world's oceans. Today, India and China place a high value on the building of aircraft carriers. The INS Vikrant is an aircraft carrier that is commissioned in 2020.³⁶

This is India's first homegrown carrier. The aircraft carrier is a critical power projection tool that can launch aircraft to support combat operations. It may also perform a variety of other functions, such as constructing sea containment zones, sea control, and long-range attack missions.

Analysis and Afterthought

The South China Sea is crucial in terms of economic, political, and military influence in the region, as evidenced by literature and historical records of the major nations and their geostrategic positions. to gain access to China's southern resources For decades, the South China Sea was an essential trading route, but in the twenty-first century, it has become one of the world's major economies.

Within the theoretical framework of lateral pressure theory, Nazli Choucri argues that states extend their political, economic, social, or military influence beyond their borders, and this study helps us understand what India has done in the South China Sea through the Look East Policy and the Act East Policy. India is constructing naval fleets and establishing political and economic relations with the countries bordering the South China Sea, increasing social interaction at the state level as well as contacts between countries and individuals, and, most

importantly, concluding military treaties with neighboring countries. South China Sea for their assistance and support in the development of military technology and the execution of joint military exercises. As a result, this theory presents models for how states might improve and expand their sphere of influence outside their borders.

Great powers like the United States and Russia are also intervening in the South China Sea by collaborating with the governments in charge of the region. In this field, the United States has numerous partners. They not only preserve business contacts; economic cooperation has also been observed. The United States has decided to enhance its support for its partner country, the Philippines, amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea. In the face of escalating tensions and worsening threats to the Philippines, the two countries have agreed to take their defense alliance to the next level. James Mattis made a cautious statement about the South China Sea. He stated that, in the absence of direct Chinese involvement, the US should take all measures to ensure freedom of navigation for all states. China has long opposed the US presence in the disputed territory, but the US is collaborating with South China Sea governments on a variety of possible solutions. It can be concluded that the United States will continue to back its allies and defend freedom of navigation while pursuing its interests in the South China Sea.

Russia has also become one of the Philippines' most vocal advocates in the South China Sea. Despite coordinated operations in the South China Sea, it appears that China and Russia are still not on the same page. Russia's actions also support this assertion. In this way, it is expanding its ties with the countries bordering the South China Sea. Russia is also building defense links with other southern Chinese countries.

Conclusion

The Chinese are well aware that any potential hindrance to Chinese trade created by a rival in the South China Sea might have far-reaching consequences for China's economy. China's commerce Indians continue to advocate for free movement of trade ships in the South China Sea. Indians feel that any disruption in the South China Sea will have a severe influence on India's trade with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, among other countries. As a result, India does not want this to happen in the future, and as a result, India has developed its policy and is focusing on South China Sea concerns. The interests of India were limited to free passage of merchant ships and unhindered commerce. As a result, the South China Sea has become a contested zone with reciprocal interests. The lateral pressure theory suggests where China and India's interests overlap. According to the theory of lateral pressure, when the interests of two entities or two countries intersect, there is a strong risk that the situation may escalate into violence. China, India's major rival in the

ASEAN region, is vehemently opposed to India's presence in an area traditionally influenced by China. The region is also vital to the United States and Western Europe, which are all vying for dominance in the ASEAN region and the South China Sea. As a result, if India wants to have a long-term relationship with the ASEAN countries, every action must be planned. India is concerned not only with keeping well-maintained coastal forces, but the Indian Navy's littoral force also significantly relies on corvettes and considers corvettes to be the lifeblood of operations. The Indian Navy as a whole, including the Brown Waters and Blue Waters Navy, is responsible with safeguarding India's interests in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The formidable Indian Navy is expected to play a key role in preserving India's interests in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea as events unfold. Both India and China have lengthy coasts, warm water ports, natural harbors, and a big special economic zone. Fortunately, India is near to the Persian Gulf, the oil hub; but, China faces the risk of its tankers traveling through significant choke spots in the Indian Ocean, such as the Strait of Malacca, Sunda, and others. As a result, China faces a higher risk of vulnerability than India. CPEC's underdevelopment is not simply an economic initiative; it is also a strategic ploy used by China to lessen its reliance on Indian Ocean shipping routes that have traditionally been competitors to India. These two adversaries have spent a lot of money in recent years developing their navies since only strong navies can secure a country's maritime interests. As a result, we can conclude that the region's geopolitical and economic realities are severe and complex. When it comes to China and India, things get even more convoluted. Much of the raw materials and energy exported to China originate in the Gulf states and Africa, via maritime channels strategically controlled by India. From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that any state must create its own laws in order to preserve the safety of these sea lanes and the free passage of commodities and warships, since the sea lanes are so crucial to the Chinese economy. In terms of achieving and safeguarding a country's marine interests, India and China are countries with lengthy territorial coasts, warm water ports, natural harbors, and vast exclusive economic zones. Fortunately, India is close to the Persian Gulf, the oil center, but it poses a higher risk to China because its tankers mostly transit critical bottlenecks in the Indian Ocean, such as the Strait of Malacca, Sunda, and others. As a result, China faces a higher risk of vulnerability than India. The underdevelopment of CPEC is not only an economic undertaking, but also a strategic technique used by China to lessen its reliance on Indian Ocean shipping routes that have traditionally been competitors to India. These two competitors have recently made significant investments. It has taken years to strengthen its navy,



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